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Comments
The Lacey Act: Extraterritorial
Application Based on an Antitrust
Paradigm
Currently, the Lacey Act applies to the illegal taking and com-
merce of fish, wildlife, and plants within the United States. This
Comment proposes amending the Lacey Act to provide for appli-
cation on an extraterritorial basis based on an antitrust paradigm.
Extraterritorial application of the Act to conduct of United States
citizens abroad would protect wildlife illegally taken outside the
United States and would punish those who, today, profit by that
taking.
INTRODUCTION
Unregulated or unsanctioned taking1 of wildlife2 combined with
destruction of habitat for agriculture or urbanization has led to the
extinction or diminution of numerous species of wildlife. 3 Congress
1. The term "taking" is defined as "to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct." The Endan-
gered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988). In this Comment, "taking" is
used consistently with this definition.
2. "Wildlife" is defined as "any wild animal, whether alive or dead, including
without limitation any wild mammal, bird, reptile, amphibian ... whether or not bred,
hatched, or born in captivity, and includes any part, product, egg, or offspring thereof."
Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U.S.C. § 3371(a) (1988).
3. "It has become increasingly apparent that some sort of protective measures
must be taken to prevent the further extinction of many of the world's animal spe-
cies . . . . The two major causes of extinction are hunting and destruction of natural
habitat." SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973),
reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2990.
recognized the irreparable consequences resulting from the unregu-
lated taking of wildlife and enacted legislation directed toward na-
tional and international taking." Specifically, Congress enacted the
Endangered Species Act5 and the Lacey Act.6
More generally, Congress enacted treaties and conventions in
which the United States and other countries agreed to restrict or ban
the taking of specified birds or wildlife.7 National laws regulate the
taking of wildlife within the United States' borders,8 and interna-
tional treaties and conventions regulate the uniform treatment of
wildlife between countries.' However, no United States law regulates
the conduct of United States citizens regarding taking wildlife while
those citizens are under the jurisdiction of other sovereign states. 10
This Comment advocates expansion of the Lacey Act's jurisdiction
to include conduct by United States citizens in foreign countries,
4. See supra note 3. In passing the Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, Congress
noted the "grim environmental consequences" resulting from the illegal wildlife trade.
SENATE CObM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, S. REP. No. 123, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 1 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1748, 1748.
5. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988). This Act is primarily directed toward the con-
servation of endangered or threatened species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the United
States. Within the Act, the United States recognized the international problem and
pledged to conserve endangered or threatened species pursuant to various international
treaties and conventions. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4) (1988).
In 1978, the National Marine Fisheries Service and the Fish and Wildlife Service
promulgated a joint regulation stating that the obligations imposed by § 7(a)(2) of the
Endangered Species Act extended to actions taken in foreign nations. That regulation
was revised in 1986 to require consultation only for actions taken in the United States or
on the high seas. Recently, the United States Supreme Court, in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992), held that environmental groups lacked standing to
challenge that revised regulation.
6. The Lacey Act proscribes illegal taking and commerce of fish, wildlife, and
plants, which taking would be illegal under any law, treaty, or regulation of the United
States, Indian, or foreign law. 16 U.S.C. § 3371(i) (1988).
7. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, Feb. 7,
1936, U.S.-Mex., 23 U.S.T. 260, T.I.A.S. No. 7302; Convention of Migratory Birds and
Their Environment, November 19, 1976, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 29 U.S.T. 4647, T.I.A.S. No.
9073; Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, opened for signature March 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249, 993
U.N.T.S. 243.
8. National laws regulating the taking of wildlife are developed and enforced by
the United States Fish and Wildlife Service. At the state level, the respective states issue
and enforce fish and game laws.
9. Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals, Feb. 7,
1936, U.S.-Mex., 23 U.S.T. 260, T.I.A.S. No. 7302.
10. United States citizens, while in another country, are subject to that country's
laws because their activities are taking place within its territory. This basis of jurisdiction
is territorial and is recognized as the normal basis for exercise of jurisdiction. See RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
cmts. a-c (1987). The Restatement is the considered opinion of the American Law Insti-
tute with regard to International law.
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known as extraterritorial jurisdiction," imposed on the basis of citi-
zenship. Currently, if a country does not regulate the taking of wild-
life, or if it does not or cannot enforce its laws, United States
citizens taking wildlife within that country go unsanctioned. These
individuals are liable for their actions only if they attempt to bring
the illegally taken wildlife across an international border. If the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service detects the illegal wildlife
shipment it can implicate the originator or owner.12
Oftentimes the actions of United States citizens abroad affect
United States jurisdictional interests given the multi-national range
of many species and their rapid depletion. Depletion of wildlife
which either migrates through the United States or which has a
range solely within a foreign country has an effect on the United
States based on global environmental concerns of conservation and
preservation. The effect illegal taking of wildlife has on United
States environmental interests is analogous to the effect of United
States business activity abroad producing injury within the United
States.' 3 Such effect justifies the imposition of jurisdiction on a citi-
zenship basis. 4 Whether jurisdiction should be imposed may be de-
termined on a case-by-case basis applying a tripartite analysis
developed in antitrust law.
Expansion of the Lacey Act's jurisdiction will allow United States
11. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is defined as "[j]uridical power which extends be-
yond the physical limits of a particular state or country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 528
(5th ed. 1979). This type of jurisdiction embraces the concept of extraterritoriality de-
fined as "[t]he extraterritorial operation of laws ... their operation upon persons, rights,
or jural relations, existing beyond the limits of the enacting state or nation, but still
amenable to its laws." Id.
12. The Lacey Act proscribes the transportation of illegally-taken wildlife.
It is unlawful for any person-
(1) to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase any fish or
wildlife or plant taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any law,
treaty, or regulation of the United States or in violation of any Indian tribal
law;
(2) to import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase in inter-
state or foreign commerce-
(A) any fish or wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of
any law or regulation of any State or in violation of any foreign law. ...
16 U.S.C. § 3372 (1988).
13. The analysis required for the application of antitrust laws to extraterritorial
activities will serve as a paradigm for the application of the Lacey Act on an extraterrito-
rial basis.
14. Section 402(2) of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
the United States imposes jurisdiction on the basis of citizenship.
officials to prosecute offenders for violations of the Lacey Act com-
mitted in other countries. Currently, violations occur when the ille-
gally-taken wildlife is moved in interstate commerce such as through
a United States international border crossing or airport.", Extraterri-
torial application of the Act will close enforcement loopholes which
allow organizations and individuals to take wildlife illegally without
threat of penalty from the United States.
Section One of this Comment discusses the Lacey Act, its histori-
cal development, modern provisions, and what problems the Act is
intended to address. Section Two proposes extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Lacey Act based on citizenship jurisdiction applied using
a tripartite antitrust analysis. Section Three analyzes application of
the Act using the tripartite analysis. Section Four discusses applica-
tion of the Lacey Act on an extraterritorial basis based on the effects
principle.1" Finally, Section Five proposes amendment of the Lacey
Act's enforcement provisions to allow private citizens to bring an ac-
tion based on existing private attorney general statutes.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LACEY ACT
A. The History of the Lacey Act
When the Lacey Act was first enacted, it prohibited the importa-
tion of certain "injurious animals and birds"'17 and required a special
permit for importation of foreign wild birds and animals. 8 Congress'
intent was to protect indigenous wildlife and agricultural and horti-
cultural industries from harm resulting from the introduction of for-
eign wildlife. The Act required marking packages containing wild
animals or birds, alive or dead.' 9 It created civil and criminal penal-
ties for violations of either provision.20
In 1981, the Lacey Act was amended to address the separate and
15. 16 U.S.C. § 3372; see supra note 12.
16. The effects principle allows the imposition of extraterritorial jurisdiction when
an activity is conducted outside a state, but has a substantial effect within that state. See
infra note 113.
17. "The importation into the United States of the mongoose, the so-called 'flying
foxes' or fruit bats, the English sparrow, the starling, and such other birds and animals
as the Secretary of the Interior may declare to be injurious to the interests of agriculture
or horticulture, is prohibited." 18 U.S.C. § 42 (1948) (current version at 16 U.S.C. 8
3372 (1988)).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 43, repealed by Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
79, 95 Stat. 1079 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-3378 (1988)).
19. "Marking" packages meant plainly labeling, the shipping package containing
wildlife with the names and addresses of the shipper and consignee and with a statement
of the contents "by number and kind." 18 U.S.C. § 44, repealed by Lacey Act Amend-
ments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-79, 95 Stat. 1079 (1988).
20. Civil penalties included fines of up to $500 and forfeiture of the wildlife. Crim-
inal penalties involved imprisonment of not more than six months. Both civil and criminal
penalties could be imposed concurrently. Id. §§ 42-44.
70
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growing problem of taking threatened or endangered wildlife for
commercial profit.2 The legislative history of the Amendments re-
flects concern in specific areas: the environmental impact caused by
the illegal trade in birds and wildlife22 and the problem of profes-
sional guides offering their services to illegally obtain wildlife.23 The
Amendments simplified administration by merging two acts, the
Black Bass Act24 and the Lacey Act, into one comprehensive act.25
The Amendments addressed enforcement problems, reclassified
criminal violations previously prosecuted as misdemeanors as felo-
nies,26  and increased monetary penalties to provide additional
deterrence.27
21. Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, Pub.'L. No. 97-79, 95 Stat. 1073 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371-78 (1988)). The Amendments of 1981 define "taken" as
"captured, killed, or collected." Id. § 3371(i).
22. SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, S. REP. No. 123, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1748, 1748.
In recent years, investigations by agents of the various agencies charged with
enforcing wildlife laws have uncovered a massive illegal trade in fish and wild-
life and their parts and products ....
The illegal wildlife trade has grim environmental consequences. It threatens
the survival of many species of wildlife, particularly those which we value be-
cause of their aesthetic or commercial values.
Id.
23. "[A] commercial arrangement whereby a professional guide offers his services
to illegally obtain wildlife is, in effect, an offer to sell wildlife." Id.
24. [The Black Bass Act] provided Federal sanctions for the illegal interstate
transportation of black bass taken, purchased, sold, or possessed in violation of
State law .... [It] was subsequently expanded to cover all species of fish, and
in 1969 was amended to encompass foreign commerce and fish taken, bought,
sold, or possessed in violation of foreign law.
SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS. S. REP. No. 123, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1748, 1749.
25. "S. 736 would correct the present insufficiencies in both the Lacey and Black
Bass Acts and combine them into one statute to simplify administration and enforcement
and promote public understanding." SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC
WORKS. S. REP. No. 123, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1981), reprinted in 1981
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1748, 1749.
26. Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 16 U:S.C. § 3373(d) (1988).
(d) Criminal penalties
(1) Any person who--
(A) knowingly imports or exports any fish or wildlife or plants in violation of
any provision of this chapter . . . shall be fined not more than $20,000, or
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both. Each violation shall be a
separate offense and the offense shall be deemed to have been committed not
only in the district where the violation first occurred, but also in any district in
which the defendant may have taken or been in possession of the said fish or
wildlife or plants.
Id.
27. Id. § 3373.
(a) Civil penalties
In 1988, the Lacey Act was again amended to address problems in
interpreting the legislature's intent and problems of enforcement
which arose after the 1981 Amendments were enacted.28 The 1988
Amendments clarified the activities subject to penalties under the
Lacey Act.29 The Amendments expanded the definition of "sale" to
include guiding services. This particular change was in response to a
circuit court decision which had held the term "sale" relating to
wildlife did not include guide services.30 The Lacey Act now specifi-
cally includes guiding services used for the illegal taking of wildlife
within the term "sale."'" The 1988 Amendments also clarified what
was considered a violation under marking offenses. 32 Finally, the
(1) Any person who engages in conduct prohibited by any provision of this
chapter (other than section 3372(b) of this title) and in the exercise of due care
should know that the fish or wildlife or plants were taken, possessed, trans-
ported, or sold in violation of, or in a manner unlawful under, any underlying
law, treaty, or regulation, may be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of
not more than $10,000 for each such violation: Provided, That when the viola-
tion involves fish or wildlife or plants with a market value of less than
$350, . . . the penalty assessed shall not exceed the maximum provided for
violation of said law, treaty, or regulation, or $10,0000, whichever is less.
Id. See supra note 26 for criminal penalties. These penalties and sanctions represent an
increase from penalties imposed under the repealed Lacey Act provisions of $500, impris-
onment for not more than six months, or both and forfeiture. Lacey Act, 18 U.S.C.S. §§
42-44 (Law. Co-op. 1979), repealed by Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-
79, 95 Stat. 1079 (1981).
28. Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 100-653, 102 Stat. 3825 (codi-
fied as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3372-75 (1988)).
29. Activities subject to penalties under the Lacey Act were expanded to specifi-
cally include "the transportation or sale of wildlife that occurs in violation of another
Federal law." SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, S, REP. No. 563,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5366, 5370.
30. In the legislative history of the 1988 Amendments to the Lacey Act, the House
Record reflects expansion of predicate offenses for purposes of the Act. These offenses
previously included taking and possessing in violation of the Marine Mammal Protection
Act. They were expanded to include transportation and sale violations of the Marine
Mammal Protection Act. In addition, in response to the circuit court decision, the
amendment specifically included the provision for obtaining guide services for illegal pur-
poses as a violation of the Act, specifically overturning the Ninth Circuit. United States
v. Stenberg, 803 F.2d 422 (9th Cir. 1986). "This amendment will provide significant
protection for wildlife, protection that Congress intended to be included under the Lacey
Act." SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, S. REP. No. 563, 100th
Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5366, 5374.
31. SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, S. REP. No. 563,
100th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5366, 5375. "Guiding,
outfitting, and transportation services related to hunting have become a substantial com-
mercial enterprise. Some individuals providing these services will knowingly violate the
law in order to please the customer and become well known. The very nature of the
enterprise can have a significant impact on the resource." Id.
32. Lacey Act Amendments of 1988, 16 U.S.C. § 3372(d) (1989).
"It is unlawful for any person to make or submit any false record, account,
or label for, or any false identification of, any fish, wildlife, or plant which has
been, or is intended to be-
(]) imported, exported, transported, sold, purchased, or received from any
foreign country; or
(2) transported in interstate or foreign commerce."
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Amendments expanded the enforcement power of officials to include
warrantless searches, seizures, and arrests within certain
guidelines."
B. Modern Provisions
Currently, the Act proscribes a wide range of activities involving
marking3 4 and nonmarking offenses. For nonmarking offenses, the
Act prohibits: (1) the import, export, transportation, sale, acquisi-
tion, or purchase of wildlife taken or possessed in violation of any
United States or Indian tribal law;35 (2) the import, export, trans-
portation, sale, acquisition, or purchase of wildlife in interstate or
foreign commerce taken in violation of any State or foreign law;3 6
and (3) the possession of wildlife taken, possessed, transported, or
sold in violation of any state, foreign, or Indian tribal law within the
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 37
Through these broad prohibitions the Act encompasses regulations
under state and federal laws, such as the Endangered Species Act of
197338 and the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 31 and inter-
national treaties, such as the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.40 However,
Id.
33. The 1988 Amendments add to the enforcement powers for persons enforcing
the Act and reduce the risk to undercover agents' personal safety or tort liability by
authorizing warrantless arrests. SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS,
S. REP. No. 563, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5366, 5375-76.
Any person authorized under subsection (a) of this section to enforce this chap-
ter may ... make an arrest without a warrant ... if the person has reasonable
grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed or is commit-
ting a felony; may search and seize, with or without a warrant.
Lacey Act Amendments of 1988, 16 U.S.C. § 3375(b) (1989).
34. A marking offense involves the shipment of wildlife in unmarked or mislabeled
packages. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(b) (1988).
35. Id. § 3372(1).
36. Id. § 3372(2).
37. Id. § 3372(3). Special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States
is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1988). See infra note 42.
38. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1988). The Endangered Species Act of 1973 provides a
means of identifying and conserving endangered and threatened species in the United
States. The Act pledges international conservation through conventions, treaties, and
other international agreements. See supra note 5 for a discussion of the application of the
Endangered Species Act to actions taken in foreign nations.
39. Id. §§ 1361-407. The Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 prohibits taking
and importing marine mammals, with specified narrow exceptions. It was enacted out of
concern that commercial fishing, which regularly involved collateral taking of dolphins
and porpoises, and unregulated taking were rapidly depleting marine populations.
40. The Migratory Bird Treaty Act, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755 (1988) (codified at 16
U.S.C. §§ 701-08, 712 (1988)).
the Act does not proscribe extraterritorial 4" conduct by United
States citizens in violation of the Lacey Act.
C. Enforcement
The Lacey Act is enforced within the special maritime and territo-
rial jurisdiction of the United States. 42 This limits the Act's jurisdic-
tion to 'United States citizens' conduct abroad where those
individuals are not subject to the jurisdiction of another country.
Therefore, the Lacey Act is enforced in regard to conduct within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States or conduct within areas
not subject to any country's sovereignty, such as the ocean floor43
and Antarctica." Such limitations result in dismissal of charges or
reversal of convictions when a United States citizen has committed
the illegal act, but was not subject to United States jurisdiction.
For example, the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 prohib-
its taking marine mammals from waters within the United States
jurisdiction or on the high seas. 45 The Act established a permanent
moratorium on taking marine mammals and excepted from its
prohibitions the taking of marine mammals pursuant to international
agreement. 4' However, in a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case, it
was not clear to the court whether the moratorium applied to con-
duct of American citizens in foreign jurisdictions or if it was limited
to areas subject to United States jurisdiction. 7 The court found
when Congress set out geographic prohibitions regarding taking
marine mammals, it did not include taking in foreign countries.48
41. Extraterritorial is defined as "[b]eyond the physical and juridical boundaries of
a particular state or country." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 528 (5th ed. 1979).
42. The special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States is defined
to include "[a]ny place outside of the jurisdiction of any nation with respect to an offense
by or against a national of the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1988).
43. Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the
Subsoil Thereof Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, U.N. Doe. A/Res/2749
(1971). This Resolution recognizes that the sea-bed, ocean floor, and subsoil are the
"common heritage of mankind," outside the sovereignty of any state. Id. at 2.
44. Antarctic Treaty, December 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780. The
Antarctic Treaty recognizes that area as part of the common heritage of mankind.
45. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-84, 1401-07
(1988).
46. "There shall be a moratorium on the taking and importation of marine mam-
mals and marine mammal products, commencing on the effective date of this chapter."
Marine Mammal Protection Act § 1371(a).
47. United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1001 (5th Cir. 1977).
48. [W]ith regard to the [Marine Mammal Protection Act] all inclusive lan-
guage that does not expressly address territoriality cannot be held to indicate
clear intent for extraterritorial application.
... The omission of the territory of other sovereigns permits the reasonable
inference that Congress concluded the prohibitions should not extend
extraterritorially.
Id. at 1004.
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Therefore, the court could infer Congress did not intend to extend
the prohibitions extraterritorially to apply to other states.49 The gov-
ernment's lack of extraterritorial jurisdiction prevented the success-
ful prosecution of an American citizen for the taking of dolphins in
the territorial sea of another country, an activity which the drafters
of the Marine Mammal Protection Act intended to prohibit. 50
The sanction of extraterritorial conduct of United States citizens
requires conduct committed in violation of another country's laws
and active enforcement of the laws by that country. If neither a pre-
scriptive law nor its enforcement mechanism is in place at the time
of the offense, the United States citizen will go unpunished.
The Lacey Act can be amended to extend its jurisdiction on an
extraterritorial basis. The United States may enforce extraterritorial
jurisdiction over its citizens on the basis of territoriality or citizen-
ship.51 Unless an intent to apply the statute in an extraterritorial
context is expressed, the statute is interpreted to apply on a territo-
rial basis only. 52 Whether the applicable law applies extraterritori-
ally depends upon its construction, not on the legislative power of
49. Id. at 1004-05. See also infra note 101.
50. Congressional findings and declaration of policy include:
(1) certain species and population stocks of marine mammals are, or may be,
in danger of extinction or depletion as a result of man's activities;
(2) such species and population stocks should not be permitted to diminish
beyond the point at which they cease to be a significant functioning element in
the ecosystem...;
(6) marine mammals have proven themselves to be resources of great inter-
national significance, esthetic and recreational as well as economic value, and it
is the sense of the Congress that they should be protected and encouraged to
develop to the greatest extent feasible commensurate with sound policies of
resource management and that the primary objective of their management
should be to maintain the health and stability of the marine ecosystem.
Marine Mammal Protection Act § 1361.
51. International law recognizes jurisdiction enforced on the basis of territoriality
or nationality.
[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to
(1) (a) conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its
territory;
(b) the status of persons, or interests in things, present within its territory;
(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial
effect within its territory;
(2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals
outside as well as within its territory.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
(1987).
52. Territoriality is the most common basis for exercise of jurisdiction. Id. § 402
cmt. b.
Congress.5"
When a question arises regarding the jurisdictional scope of a stat-
ute, courts first look to the statute, then to legislative reports and
history to determine the legislature's intent in application.5 4 Where
the statute applies extraterritorially, as in the area of antitrust law,
the courts do not apply the law mechanically, but balance competing
interests of the United States and the country in which the activity is
alleged to have taken place before exercising jurisdiction.5 Even
when the statute specifies a basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction,
such jurisdiction is not exercised if to do so would be unreasonable. 0
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION MAY BE EXERCISED
BASED ON UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IS
SUPPORTED BY THE ANTITRUST ANALOGY
The Lacey Act should be applied on an extraterritorial basis to
United States citizens. Extraterritorial exercise would not affect citi-
zens of foreign countries in which conduct occurs. Jurisdiction based
solely on citizenship is recognized by the international community as
53. Legislation is considered to apply only within the territorial boundaries of the
United States unless an intent of extraterritorial application is found in the statute. "By
virtue of the obligations of citizenship, the United States retained its authority over [the
United States citizen], and he was bound by its laws made applicable to him in a foreign
country." Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 436 (1932). International law limits
the international exercise of United States jurisdiction by requiring such exercise to be
reasonable. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403 (1987). When the exercise of jurisdiction by the United States and another
sovereign state is not unreasonable, but conflicts, each state must evaluate its interests
and the interests of the other state in exercising jurisdiction. The state with the stronger
interest prevails; the state with the lesser interest should modify or abandon its regulation
to eliminate the conflict. Id. § 403 cmt. e.
54. "Resolution of the jurisdictional issue in this case therefore depends on con-
struction of exercised congressional power, not the limitations upon that power itself."
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 282-83 (1952); accord Blackmer v. United
States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932).
55. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1296 (3d Cir.
1979).
This may, indeed, be a situation where the consequences to the American econ-
omy and policy permit no alternative to firm judicial action enforcing our anti-
trust laws abroad. But before that step is taken, there should be a weighing of
competing interests .... When foreign nations are involved ... it is unwise to
ignore the fact that foreign policy, reciprocity, comity, and limitations of judi-
cial power are considerations that should have a bearing on the decision to
exercise or decline jurisdiction.
Id.
56. "Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under section 402 is present, a
state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or activity
having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdiction is unreason-
able." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 403 (1987). See infra note 93 listing factors which determine if exercise of jurisdiction
is unreasonable.
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a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction in foreign relations law57 and
is supported by the privileges and obligations which accompany
citizenship.58
American antitrust laws were enacted to protect intrastate and in-
terstate commerce, including commerce with foreign countries, by
proscribing activities conducted in restraint of trade .5  These laws
extend extraterritorially over the activities of Americans abroad and
may encompass the activities of foreign citizens.6 0 However, because
there are implications and consequences which arise from applying
antitrust laws to violations alleged to have been committed in a for-
eign country, more than a mechanical application of the law is in-
volved.6" Where application of antitrust laws on an extraterritorial
basis is requested, the reviewing court conducts a tripartite analysis,
57. "[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to ... the activities,
interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory." RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402
(1987).
58. See supra note 53.
59. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988); the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
12-27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (1988); the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-9 (1988).
"Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal." The Sherman Act § 1. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 415 cmt. a (1987):
If a principal purpose of the challenged conduct or agreement outside the
United States is to interfere with the commerce of the United States, and the
conduct or agreement has some (i.e., not insignificant) effect on that com-
merce, it is presumptively reasonable for the United States to exercise jurisdic-
tion over that conduct or agreement, even if the actual effect proves to be
insubstantial.
Id.
60. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945)
(holding that any state may impose liability on a foreign corporation which acts in viola-
tion of the Sherman Act with intent to and which did affect imports into the United
States); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962)
(holding that defendants, which included a foreign corporation, could be liable for anti-
trust violations under the Sherman Act); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S.
268 (1927) (holding that both the United States importer and the Mexican supplier of
sisal were within the court's jurisdiction).
61. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1976). In this case, the court analyzed whether extraterritorial jurisdiction in anti-
trust law should be exercised. The court stated:
That American law covers some conduct beyond this nation's borders does not
mean that it embraces all, however. Extraterritorial application is understanda-
bly a matter of concern for the other countries involved .... In the domestic
field the Sherman Act extends to the full reach of the commerce power ....
[Iln the foreign commerce area courts have generally, and logically, fallen
back on a narrower construction of congressional intent.
Id. at 609.
discussed at length in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America,
N.T. & S.A..2 This tripartite analysis has been subsequently ap-
proved by the Department of Justice6 3 and followed in other United
States courts."
The first part of the tripartite analysis determines whether the al-
leged activity has some actual or intended effect on American for-
eign commerce. 65 There is no consensus among American courts and
commentators on how to determine when an effect is substantial
enough to justify the imposition of jurisdiction.66 In the context of
the tripartite analysis, because the effects test considers only the ef-
fect the alleged trade violation has on American foreign commerce,
the Timberlane court found the test incomplete and required addi-
tional analysis to consider the foreign country's interests in the al-
leged violation. 7 That analysis considers other nations' interests,
incorporating principles of comity,68 while scrutinizing the effect the
conduct within the foreign country has within the United States.
In the second part of the analysis, the effect the alleged activity
has on American foreign commerce is scrutinized to determine if the
effect is substantial enough to constitute an injury to the plaintiff
such that an antitrust action may be sustained.69 In situations where
the United States brings the action, it may not be necessary to
demonstrate as great a restraint on trade as in a private action.70
62. 549 F.2d at 597.
63. The Department of Justice is cited as approving Timberlane's tripartite analy-
sis. S. CHESTERFIELD OPPENHEIM ET AL., FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 989 n.35 (4th ed.
1981).
64. Cases which follow the Timberlane analysis include Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980), and Mannington Mills,
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979). See also S. CHESTERFIELD OP-
PENHEIM ET AL., FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS 989-90 n.36 (4th ed. 1981).
65. "It is the effect on American foreign commerce which is usually cited to sup-
port extraterritorial jurisdiction." Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 610 (emphasis added),
66. Courts have required a "direct and substantial effect" on American foreign
commerce. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 610 (district court concluded this was a prereq-
uisite). Other courts use different expressions: Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88
(1917) ("the combination affected the foreign commerce of this country"); United States
v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 309 (N.D. Ohio 1949) ("a direct and
influencing effect on trade"). Commentators also use different language: RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402(c) (1987)
("conduct . . . that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory");
James A. Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction of the American Antitrust Laws, 43
ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 523 (1974) ("(1) if it occurs in the course of foreign commerce, or
(2) if it substantially affects either foreign or interstate commerce").
67. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 611-12.
68. Comity is defined to mean "courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to
laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction . . . out of deference and
mutual respect." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 242 (5th ed. 1979).
69. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613 (citing Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas
& Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102-03 (C.D. Cal. 1971), affid, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972)).
70. Id.
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In the third part of the tripartite analysis, the court determines
whether the interests of and connections to the United States in rela-
tion to the interests of and connections to other nations justify the
assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction.7" The Timberlane Court
preferred evaluating and balancing the relevant elements on a case-
by-case basis.72
The elements presented in Timberlane7 3 were further refined in
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.74 These elements
include:
(1) The degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
(2) The nationality of the parties;
(3) The importance of the alleged violation of conduct in the United States
compared to that abroad;
(4) The availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation
there;
(5) The existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its
foreseeability;
(6) Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction
and grants relief;
(7) If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of
being forced to perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflict-
ing requirements by both countries;
(8) Whether the court can make its order effective;
(9) Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made
by the foreign nation under similar circumstances;
(10) Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
7 5
In evaluating these elements, the reviewing court should identify
71. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613. The court stated, "[A]n effect on United States
commerce, although necessary to the exercise of jurisdiction under the antitrust laws, is
alone not a sufficient basis on which to determine whether American authority should be
asserted in a given case as a matter of international comity and fairness." Id.
72. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613. The court called this evaluation and balancing a
"jurisdictional rule of reason." Id. (quoting KINGMAN BREWSTER, JR.. ANTITRUST AND
AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958)).
73. The elements specified in Timberlane were:
the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the nationality or allegiance of
the parties and the locations or principal places of business of corporations, the
extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compli-
ance, the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with
those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect
American commerce, the foreseeability of such effect, and the relative impor-
tance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as com-
pared with conduct abroad.
549 F.2d at 614. In the third part of the tripartite analysis, these elements provide spe-
cific factors for determining whether to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction. See infra notes
91-112 and accompanying text.
74. 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (1979).
75. Id. These elements are a further refinement of the factors listed by the court in
Timberlane to determine whether to enforce extraterritorial jurisdiction.
potential conflicts which might arise if extraterritorial jurisdiction is
asserted.76 The court should determine whether the interests of the
United States are sufficient to assert extraterritorial jurisdiction."
The application and analysis of these elements takes into considera-
tion principles of international comity and fairness regarding appli-
cation of laws on an extraterritorial basis. 8
Before the court conducts the tripartite analysis, it scrutinizes the
alleged violation to determine if the antitrust action is barred by the
"Act of State" doctrine.79 The Act of State doctrine will only be
applied where the alleged violation was committed by a foreign gov-
ernment. It requires the reviewing court to abstain from inquiring
into the validity of acts by a foreign government.80 The act of a sov-
ereign power of a foreign state in its own territory cannot be ques-
tioned or be the subject of a legal proceeding.81 This doctrine results
in American courts rejecting private claims brought against a for-
eign government which allege a violation of American or interna-
tional law. More recently, there has been a shift in focus to concerns
for preserving basic relationships between government branches in a
system of separation of powers.82 However, when the foreign govern-
ment's action consists of mere approval, or it takes no action but
merely allows the conduct, the Act of State doctrine does not ap-
ply.83 This allows the adjudication of claims involving violations of
76. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
77. Id. at 614-15.
78. Id. at 615.
79. Mannington, 595 F.2d at 1292.
The doctrine is a policy of judicial abstention from inquiry into the validity of
an act by a foreign government. The premise upon which it rests is that an act
by the sovereign power of a foreign state or by its authorized agent in its own
territory and within the scope and authority of the office cannot be questioned
or made the subject of legal proceedings in our courts.
Id.
80. Id.
81. "Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other
sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts of the
government of another done within its own territory." Id. (quoting Underhill v. Her-
nandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)); accord American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
213 U.S. 347 (1909).
82. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964).
The doctrine as formulated in past decisions expresses the strong sense of the
Judicial Branch that its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of
foreign acts of state may hinder rather than further this country's pursuit of
goals both for itself and for the community of nations as a whole in the inter-
national sphere.
Id. This case expresses the modern interpretation of the Act of State doctrine which is
concerned with preserving relationships in a system of separation of powers by not hin-
dering the executive's conduct of foreign policy by judicial review or review of foreign
acts. Id.
83. For example, in Mannington, the court found the Act of State doctrine did not
apply because the foreign government involved did not act affirmatively, but issued for-
eign manufacturing patents to Congoleum based on its representations. Mannington
80
[VOL. 29: 67. 1992] The Lacey Act
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
antitrust law or, by analogy, violations of the Lacey Act.
III. THE LACEY ACT SHOULD BE APPLIED TO
EXTRATERRITORIAL CONDUCT OF UNITED STATES CITIZENS
FOLLOWING THE TRIPARTITE ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
JURISDICTION ANALOGY
An analysis of whether the Lacey Act should apply on an extra-
territorial basis should be conducted within the framework of the
Timberlane tripartite analysis. International interests of the govern-
ments involved and considerations of comity and fairness would be
reviewed before the Act is applied. Such an analysis avoids a blanket
application of law within a sensitive international context.
In the first prong of the analysis, the reviewing body considers
whether the alleged violations have an effect on the United States
sufficient to sustain an action brought under the Lacey Act. As
stated in Timberlane, there must be some effect on the activity in
question.84 Here, the illegal taking of wildlife in a foreign country
must have some effect on the United States.
Congress has stated the illegal taking of wildlife in other countries
has severe environmental consequences, as well as health and safety
risks to domestic animals in the United States.8 5 Congress also
demonstrated its belief that activities occurring abroad which extin-
guish or diminish wildlife have an effect on the United States.86 Ac-
tivities in a foreign country which diminish or extinguish indigenous
or migratory wildlife have the effect of making that wildlife unavail-
able for aesthetic, cultural, or economic purposes to United States
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293-94 (1979).
84. "[T]here [must] be some effect-actual or intended-on American foreign
commerce before the federal courts may legitimately exercise subject matter jurisdiction
under those statutes." Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A., 549
F.2d 597, 613 (1976).
85. The Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, reprinted in
1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1748, 1748.
The illegal wildlife trade has grim environmental consequences. It threatens
the survival of many species of wildlife, particularly those which we value be-
cause of their aesthetic or commercial values. The economic consequences of
this trade are also severe. It directly threatens America's agriculture and pet
industries and indirectly burdens individual taxpayers.
Id. See also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2151 (1992) (Stevens, J.
concurring) (citing Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 179 (1978)).
86. Congress expressed its intent "to conserve to the extent practicable the various
species of fish or wildlife . . . facing extinction." Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16
U.S.C. § 1531(a)(4) (1988). See also Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1361-84, 1401-07 (1988).
citizens as well as the citizens of the country in which the illegal
taking occurs. Therefore, the illegal taking of wildlife in a foreign
country has an effect on the United States which should be sufficient
to satisfy the first prong of the analysis.
The second prong of the analysis is to determine whether the ef-
fect on the United States is sufficiently large to present a recogniza-
ble injury, and thus a criminal or civil violation of the Lacey Act.87
Conventions and treaties enacted between the United States and
other countries for the protection of wildlife in other countries
demonstrate the United States' strong commitment to preservation
of wildlife wherever such wildlife occurs.88 As discussed previously,
the introduction of illegally-taken wildlife into the United States
presents serious risks to the agriculture industry.89 However, when
the illegal taking of wildlife in other countries presents an injury to
the United States sufficient to sustain a criminal or civil action under
the Lacey Act, an analysis of elements which considers international
comity and fairness, conducted in the third prong of the analysis, is
required before making a decision to impose extraterritorial
jurisdiction.9"
The third prong of the analysis weighs and considers each element
to determine whether the interests of and connections with the
United States are sufficient, when compared with the interests of
other nations, to justify the assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 91
The first issue considered is whether enforcement of the Lacey Act
on an extraterritorial basis conflicts with foreign law or policy. 92
87. "Second, a greater showing of burden or restraint may be necessary to demon-
strate that the effect is sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to the plaintiffs."
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613 (citing Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil
Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102-03 (C.D. Cal. 1971), a~fd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
88. For example, the Endangered Species Act lists species considered endangered
or threatened occurring 'throughout the world and pledges to conserve such species. En-
dangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (1988). To further deter the taking of
threatened and endangered species, the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora prohibits trade in endangered wildlife or their
parts. It is the primary international agreement for the control of trade in illegal wildlife
products. Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, opened for signature Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, T.I.A.S. No. 8249.
89. See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text.
90. "An effect on United States commerce ... is alone not a sufficient basis on
which to determine whether American authority should be asserted in a given case as a
matter of international comity and fairness." Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
91. Id.
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403(3) (1987).
When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise jurisdic-
tion over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are in
conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the other
state's interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light 'of all the relevant factors.
Id. This section does not apply when a person subject to the regulations of two states can
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Conflict is tied to the availability of a remedy abroad, the existence
of foreign law, the pendency of litigation there, and the foreign coun-
try's action on violation of its law. In countries which have no laws
regulating the taking of wildlife, imposition of the Lacey Act will not
create a conflict. In countries which do have laws regulating the tak-
ing of wildlife, the issue is whether these countries enforce their
laws. Countries may regulate the taking of wildlife but not enforce
their laws. This lack of enforcement may stem from indifference,
lack of adequate funding, or the lack of an adequate infrastructure
for effective enforcement. If foreign laws are not enforced, extrater-
ritorial application of the Lacey Act to United States citizens will
not create a conflict. However, if the violation occurs in countries
which regulate the taking of wildlife and which enforce their laws,
the United States will have to determine whether its interests in im-
posing sanctions on its citizens are stronger than the foreign coun-
try's interests. 93
Another factor to consider is the importance of the alleged viola-
tion of conduct in the United States compared to that abroad. 4 The
United States has demonstrated the importance it attaches to taking
of wildlife by actively participating in conventions and treaties regu-
lating such taking.9" In addition, the United States has provided for
comply with the laws of both. Id. § 403(3) cmt. e.
93. This determination may be based on factors specified in § 403 of the Restate-
ment (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States which states:
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable
is determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity of the territory of the regulating state ... ;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, be-
tween the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activ-
ity...;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation
to the regulating state ... ;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system ... ;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403
(1987). Principles of reasonableness have been interpreted as requiring comity.
94. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
95. See supra note 7. However, federal agencies are involved in funding projets in
foreign countries which may result in harm to endangered species. See Lujan v. Defend-
ers of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2152 n.l (1992) (Blackmun, J. dissenting). "The record
financial contributions to foreign countries to aid in the conservation
of wildlife.96 Under circumstances where a country in which wildlife
is taken either has no wildlife laws or fails to enforce its wildlife
laws, the responsibility for deterring the taking of wildlife should ac-
crue to the United States.
The analysis of the existence of intent to harm or affect American
commerce and its foreseeability is, by analogy, inapplicable to ana-
lyzing the application of the Lacey Act in an extraterritorial con-
text.9" While it is possible some United States citizens take wildlife
in other countries in defiance of United States laws, most individuals
take wildlife for recreation or commercial profit.98 The Lacey Act is
primarily directed toward commercial trade in wildlife.99
An additional factor to consider is whether the assertion of extra-
territorial jurisdiction has an effect upon foreign relations. 100 If the
Lacey Act is imposed extraterritorially upon United States citizens
when those individuals are not apprehended or prosecuted by the
country in which their acts were committed, the Act will not conflict
with any action of the foreign country due to that country's nonfea-
sance. If the country in which the wildlife is being taken condones
the taking of wildlife, active prosecution by the United States under
the Lacey Act will have a deterrent effect upon the taking.
The United States must consider whether the importance of deter-
ring the taking of wildlife, the protection of which is recognized by
the United States, outweighs the foreign country's interest in al-
lowing the taking to occur.' 0' Enforcement of standards regarding
either harmful economic activities in an antitrust context or harmful
is replete with genuine issues of fact about the harm to endangered species from the
Aswan and Mahaweli projects." Id.
96. See supra note 95. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 provides assistance
to foreign countries in the form of foreign currencies and acquisition of lands and waters
to foreign countries. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1537 (1988).
97. This is the fifth factor considered in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corporation, 595 F.2d 1287, 1297 (1979).
98. The Lacey Act Amendments of 1981 specifically address this issue: "investi-
gations by agents ...have uncovered a massive illegal trade in fish and wildlife ...
much of this illegal, and highly profitable, trade is handled by well organized large vol-
ume operations run by professional criminals." SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENT AND
PUBLIC WORKS. S. REP. No. 123, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1981), reprinted in 1981
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1748, 1748.
99. See supra note 98.
100. Mannington, 595 F.2d at 1297.
101. United States v. Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996, 1004 (1977).
We cannot say that the interests of the United States in preserving dolphins
outweighs the interest of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas in preserving its
character as a tourist attraction by the issuance of a limited number of permits
for the capture of dolphins within its narrow band of territorial waters.
Id. In this case, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, which proscribed the activity, was
found to be inapplicable to activity in another country's territory.
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environmental depredations depends upon extraterritorial applica-
tion. The United States can build from a floor of enforcement set by
interstate commerce and jurisdictional requirements, giving law en-
forcement officials the ability to prosecute United States citizens for
committing acts in violation of the Act outside the country. To effec-
tively enforce its standards, the United States can continue the cur-
rent trend of foreign policy incentives, such as trading debt for
environmental conservation efforts10 2 or placing trade embargoes on
countries which refuse to cooperate.10 3 These enforcement activities
should have the effect of bringing countries which either fail to en-
force or which violate environmental standards into compliance with
the higher standards set by the United States.
Will the grant of relief by the United States place a party in the
position of being forced to perform an act illegal in either country or
impose conflicting requirements by both countries? This question
turns on whether the conduct is compelled by a foreign govern-
ment.10 4 The possibility of conflict or of being compelled to act is
more pertinent in application of antitrust laws, where the activity in
question involves conducting business abroad. 5 In contrast, the tak-
ing of wildlife involves affirmative acts which are done either under
permits issued by the government of the foreign country or without
that government's express permission. The issue of compulsion,
therefore, rarely arises.
102. For example, Argentina has a debt for nature swap program by which credi-
tor nations can trade existing debt for natural grassland and forest preservation. Na-
tional Development Bank Announces Its Handling of Debt-for-Nature Bonds, 13 Int'l
Envtl. Rep. (BNA) No. 2, at 64 (Feb. 14, 1990).
103. Commentators have stated, "The economic sanction has emerged as a key
device for a significant number of states, either individually or collectively, to enforce
international norms." David D. Caron, International Sanctions, Ocean Management, and
the Law of the Sea: A Study of Denial of Access to Fisheries, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 311,
326 (1989).
An example of an economic sanction imposed by the United States occurred in 1988
when the United States refused to allow Japan to fish in United States waters pending
compliance with the International Whaling Commission Moratorium on commercial
whaling. This was in response to Japan's killing 300 Minke Whales in Antarctic waters
under the guise of scientific experiments for commercial purposes. President Reagan De-
nies Japan Fishing Access to U.S. Waters Because of Whaling Violation, 11 Int'l Envtl.
Rep. (BNA) No. 4, at 236 (Apr. 13, 1988).
104. This is known as the defense of foreign compulsion, which shields from anti-
trust liability the acts of parties carried out in obedience to the mandate of a foreign
government. The sovereign compulsion defense is not principally concerned with the va-
lidity of legality of the foreign government's order, but rather with whether it compelled
the American business to violate American antitrust law. Mannington, 595 F.2d at 1293.
105. See supra note 104.
Can the court effectively enforce its order when it imposes penal-
ties pursuant to the Lacey Act? Provisions of the Act are imposed
after the United States citizen returns to his or her residence, either
in the United States or abroad. Therefore, service can be effected
and penalties enforced.106
Another consideration is whether the order of a foreign country
for relief against environmental infringements would be acceptable
in the United States if made under similar circumstances. Currently,
the United States cooperates with other countries in enforcing for-
eign court orders and extradition requests. 10 7 Because the United
States has demonstrated and expressed its commitment to the con-
servation of wildlife, it should honor a foreign country's order
against a United States citizen for a violation of that nation's conser-
vation laws. In this situation, the foreign country actively enforces its
wildlife laws, apprehending and sanctioning United States citizens in
violation of those laws.
The final factor to consider is whether a treaty with the nation in
which the conduct occurs addresses the issue.'0 8 In some instances, a
treaty exists with respect to the wildlife in question, 09 in which the
treaty would control. 10 However, arguably, when treaty provisions
are not enforced by the country in which the acts are committed, the
United States may exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction upon its citi-
zens pursuant to its power under the treaty by enforcing the provi-
sions of the Lacey Act. The United States exercise of jurisdiction
would be based on its interest in requiring its citizens to obey its
laws and in protecting the environment. In addition, a treaty does
not give citizens a private right of action unless its provisions pre-
scribe a rule by which those rights may be enforced."' The review-
ing court determines if the treaty confers a private right of action
106. In Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1931), the Court found
that "the United States possesses the power inherent in sovereignty to require the return
to this country of a citizen, resident elsewhere, whenever the public interest requires it,
and to penalize him in case of refusal." The Court stated, "The jurisdiction of the United
States over its absent citizen, so far as the binding effect of its legislation is concerned, is
a jurisdiction in personam, as he is personally bound to take notice of the laws that are
applicable to him and to obey them." Id. at 438 (citing United States v. Bowman, 260
U.S. 94, 102 (1922)).
107. Cooperation with foreign states is consistent with principles of comity, which
includes respect for the laws of foreign states and reciprocity. See supra note 68.
108. "[A]II Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
109. See, e.g., supra note 7.
110. See supra note 108.
111. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corporation, 595 F.2d 1287, 1298
(quoting Head Money Cases [Edye v. Robertson], 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884)) ("A
treaty, then, is a law of the land as an act of Congress is, whenever its provisions pre-
scribe a rule by which the rights of the private citizen or subject may be determined.").
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under its provisions.1 1 2
The tripartite analysis considers both the interests of foreign coun-
tries and the interests of the United States when applying and en-
forcing the Lacey Act extraterritorially. When the Act is applied to
United States citizens in a foreign country which is not enforcing its
conservation laws, the Act does not restrict the rights of foreign citi-
zens nor does it interfere with that country's enforcement of its laws.
Therefore, applicaton of the Act does not interfere with foreign pol-
icy or government, except to the extent the foreign country allows
the taking of wildlife recognized by the United States as endangered
or threatened.
IV. EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IMPOSED PURSUANT TO THE
LACEY ACT MAY ALSO BE ENFORCED BASED ON THE EFFECTS
PRINCIPLE
Extraterritorial jurisdiction may be imposed based on conduct tak-
ing place outside the state, but which has an effect within the
state." 3 This basis of jurisdiction is known as the effects principle.11 4
The Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States has recognized that the effects principle may be ap-
plied to exercise jurisdiction when the effect is substantial and the
exercise of jurisdiction reasonable.1 1 5
Factors determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction is unrea-
sonable include: the activity's link to the regulating state's terri-
tory,'16 the connections between the regulating state and the person
112. Mannington, 595 F.2d at 1299.
113. The rationale underlying this exercise of jurisdiction is known as the effects
principle. "Jurisdiction with respect to activity outside the state, but having or intended
to have substantial effect within the state's territory, is an aspect of jurisdiction based on
territoriality, although it is sometimes viewed as a distinct category." RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 cmt. d (1987).
114. See supra note 113.
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 402 cmt. d (1987). "This Restatement takes the position that a state may
exercise jurisdiction based on effects in the state, when the effect or intended effect is
substantial and the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable under section 403." Id. "The
principle that an exercise of jurisdiction on one of the bases indicated in section 402 is
nonetheless unlawful if it is unreasonable is established in United States law, and has
emerged as a principle of international law as well." Id. § 403 cmt. a.
116. Id. § 403(2)(a).
responsible for regulating the activity,117 the character and impor-
tance of the regulated activity," 8 the existence of justified expecta-
tions which may be affected by the regulation,"" the regulation's
importance to the international system, 20 the extent to which the
regulation is consistent with international traditions,' 2' whether an-
other state has an interest in regulating the activity, 22 and the likeli-
hood of conflict with another state's regulations. 23 These factors are
not intended to be exhaustive 24 and should be applied on a case-by-
case basis. 25
In Timberlane, the court conducted an analysis to determine
whether the alleged activity had some effect on American foreign
commerce before it exercised subject matter jurisdiction. 28 The
court found the standards used to analyze the effect of the activity
on American foreign commerce varied. 27 Where the effect on com-
merce is analyzed in a foreign commerce setting, the court found
that factors other than the effect on American foreign commerce
should be considered. 28 However, analysis of the factors in the Re-
statement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
takes into consideration international issues of comity and fairness in
the application of jurisdiction.2 9
117. Id. § 403(2)(b).
118. Id. § 403(2)(c).
119. Id. § 403(2)(d).
120. Id. § 403(2)(e). This can be political, legal, or economic.
121. Id. § 403(2)(f).
122. Id. § 403(2)(g).
123. Id. § 403(2)(h).
124. Id. § 403 cmt. b.
125. Id. "Not all considerations have the same importance in all situations; the
weight to be given to any particular factor or group of factors depends on the circum-
stances." Id.
126. "[T]he antitrust laws require in the first instance that there be some ef-
fect-actual or intended-on American foreign commerce before the federal courts may
legitimately exercise subject matter jurisdiction .... Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of
America, N.T. & S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 613 (1976).
127. The court in Timberlane stated, "Even among American courts and commen-
tators, however, there is no consensus on how far the jurisdiction should extend." 549
F.2d at 610. Some courts require a "direct and substantial effect" on American foreign
commerce, while others use different expressions, such as "intended to affect," "a direct
and influencing effect," or "a conspiracy ... which affects." Id. at 610-11.
128. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 611.
Although courts have spoken in terms of the Restatement and of congressional
policy, findings that an American effect was direct, substantial, and foresee-
able, or within the scope of congressional intent, have little independent ana-
lytic significance. Instead, cases appear to turn on a reconciliation of American
and foreign interests in regulating their respective economies and business af-
fairs....
Id. (quoting William Fugate, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud,
89 HARV. L. REv. 553, 563 (1976)).
129. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403 (1987).
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Where the taking of wildlife in a foreign country would be illegal
under the Lacey Act, such taking should be subject to civil or crimi-
nal prosecution pursuant to the Act based on the effects principle.
The effect a taking has on the United States is twofold. First, the
introduction of illegal wildlife into the United States endangers the
agriculture and horticulture industries through the introduction of
disease.' 30 Second, illegal wildlife threatens indigenous wildlife
through the introduction of disease and the possibility of predation,
or domination of the introduced species over indigenous species in
relation to habitat essential for nourishment and reproduction.13 '
The harmful effect on the United States economy and indigenous
wildlife justifies the imposition of the Lacey Act based on extraterri-
torial conduct by United States citizens. Third, the illegal taking of
wildlife in a foreign country reduces the populations of that species,
making it less available for recreational, nonconsumptive purposes. 132
The simple knowledge that a given species is no longer represented
in the wild has an effect on the United States through that species'
recreational unavailability.
130. The effect on the United States economy has been well documented.
Imported wildlife carry diseases that can affect poultry, livestock, fish and pets.
The most important of these diseases is exotic Newcastle disease, which is
transmitted by imported birds to native birds, including poultry. In 1971, the
Federal Government destroyed more than 12 million fowl in poultry stocks ex-
posed to this disease. That outbreak cost the Federal taxpayers $56 million.
Outbreaks in 1979 and 1980 cost taxpayers more than $2 million each. Ac-
cording to 1975 Department of Agriculture estimates, if the disease becomes
established in the United States, the yearly losses could amount to $230 million
or more.
Legislative History of Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1981),
reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1748, 1748-49.
131. See supra note 130. "The illegal wildlife trade ... threatens the survival of
many species of wildlife, particularly those which we value because of their aesthetic or
commercial values." Legislative history of Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1748, 1748.
132. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 231 n.4
(1986).
[Respondents] undoubtedly have alleged a sufficient "injury in fact" in that the
whale watching and studying of their members will be adversely affected by
continued whale harvesting, and this type of injury is within the "zone of inter-
ests" protected by the Pelly and Packwood Amendments.
Id.
V. UNITED STATES CITIZENS SHOULD HAVE STANDING TO BRING
AN ACTION FOR VIOLATION OF THE LACEY ACT
The policy served by the Lacey Act, deterring the illegal capture,
sale, purchase, or transportation of wildlife, would be served by pri-
vate actions brought for civil damages as well as by governmental
action. These actions are known as citizen suit enforcement,1 3 3 or
private attorney general actions.3 In order for a private citizen to
bring a legal action, the statute must contain a private attorney gen-
eral enforcement provision specifically allowing legal action on be-
half of the state,13 5 and the citizen must have standing to bring the
action.13 6
The United States Supreme Court found that changes to the envi-
ronment could result in an injury recognized by the Court as confer-
ring standing upon an individual.1 37 An organization which brings an
action claiming an interest in the problem does not have standing to
bring the action.13 8 However, an individual may bring an action if he
or she claims an injury personal to that individual. 39
133. Citizen suit enforcement is enforcement of an existing law through a legal
action brought by a private citizen on behalf of the public interest. See JEFFREY G.
MILLER. CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL
LAWS 1-2 (1987).
134. Id. at 1 n.1. "[T]he citizen suit provision created 'private attorneys general' to
aid in enforcement." id.
135. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1971). "Where the party does not
rely on any specific statute authorizing invocation of the judicial process, the question of
standing depends upon whether the party has alleged such a 'personal stake in the out-
come of the controversy.'" Id.
136. "Whether a party has a sufficient stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy
to obtain judicial resolution of that controversy is what has traditionally been referred to
as the question of standing to sue." Id. at 731-32.
137. Id. at 734.
We do not question that this type of harm may amount to an 'injury in fact'
sufficient to lay the basis for standing under § 10 of the APA. Aesthetic and
environmental well-being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients
of the quality of life in our society, and the fact that particular environmental
interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them less
deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.
Id.
138. Id. at 739.
139. The Court indicated in Sierra Club that injuries may reflect "'aesthetic, con-
servational, and recreational' as well as economic values." 405 U.S. at 738 (quoting Data
Processing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154). The Court further stated in Lujan that
"the desire to use or observe an animal species, even for purely aesthetic purposes, is
undeniably a cognizable interest for purpose of standing." 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992).
However, in that case, the Court held that organization groups lacked standing to
challenge the revision of § 7(a)(2) to the Endangered Species Act. The Court stated that
the affidavits submitted by individual members of the groups contained no facts showing
how damages to the endangered species would harm those individuals. Id. at 2138. The
Court stated:
To survive the Secretary's summary judgement motion, respondents had to
submit affidavits or other evidence showing, through specific facts, not only
that listed species were in fact being threatened by funded activities abroad,
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Therefore, if a private attorney general provision were added to
the enforcement provisions of the Lacey Act, an individual could
bring suit alleging injury based on an impact on his recreation, con-
servation activities, or aesthetic pleasure. People traveling in foreign
countries who observe others engaged in the illegal taking of wildlife
would have standing to sue.
Private citizen involvement would provide support to United
States agencies with insufficient resources to address the problem. 14 0
Further, provisions in private attorney general statutes provide for
the award of costs of suit, including reasonable attorneys and expert
witness fees."" Use of these provisions would allow concerned citi-
zens to pursue violations of the Lacey Act without requiring them to
privately bear the costs of suit.'42
A private attorney general statute could be tailored to require citi-
zens, prior to bringing an action against the violator, to give notice of
a violation to the United States Wildlife Service, United States Cus-
toms Service, and any state agency which enforces fish and wildlife
provisions. This would allow agencies to determine whether the
agency or the citizen should enforce the Lacey Act and its penalty
provisions against alleged violators. On balance, creating a private
but also that one or more of respondents' members would thereby be "directly"
affected apart from their "'special interest' in the subject."
Id. at 2137-38.
140. See supra note 133. "Federal or state enforcement resources might be insuffi-
cient." JEFFREY G. MILLER. CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLU-
TION CONTROL LAWS 1 n.1 (1987).
141. Id. at 9.
142. For an example of a private attorney general provision see Endangered Spe-
cies Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g). "[A]ny person may commence a civil suit on his own
behalf... to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other governmental
instrumentality or agency ... who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this
chapter. . . ." Id. § 1540(g)(A) (quoted in Lujan, 112 S. Ct. at 2142). The Court in
Lujan held that this provision did not give environmental groups standing to challenge
the government's violation of a procedural duty, i.e., consultation with the Secretary of
the Interior before taking action.
See also SAFE DRINKING WATER AND TOXIC ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1986, CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25249.7 (West Supp. 1991).
(d) Actions pursuant to this section may be brought by any person in the
public interest if (1) the action is commenced more than, sixty days after the
person has given notice of the violation which is the subject of the action to the
Attorney General and the district attorney and any city attorney in whose ju-
risdiction the violation is alleged to occur and to the alleged violator, and (2)
neither the Attorney General nor any district attorney nor any city attorney or
prosecutor has commenced and is diligently prosecuting an action against such
violation.
Id.
attorney general enforcement provision for the Lacey Act would ben-
efit United States agencies and concerned citizens by allowing indi-
viduals to act on violations personally known to them which harm
and diminish species.143
CONCLUSION
Amending the jurisdiction of the Lacey Act to impose sanctions on
United States citizens on an extraterritorial basis provides an en-
forcement mechanism for acts committed in violation of United
States laws, conventions, or treaties. The amendment builds from the
floor of enforcement set by interstate commerce and jurisdictional
requirements, giving law enforcement officials the ability to prose-
cute violators for acts committed outside the United States. It
reaches into foreign countries which have little infrastructure or en-
forcement capabilities and prevents decimation of wildlife resources.
The Lacey Act will only be applied to extraterritorial conduct af-
ter a tripartite analysis is conducted. This analysis determines
whether the activity affects the United States, whether the effect is
sufficient to recognize imposition of the Lacey Act on an extraterri-
torial basis, and whether jurisdiction should be imposed after consid-
ering individual factors which weigh the United States interests
against those of the foreign nation in which the act is committed.
Thus, the tripartite analysis serves as a safeguard against uninhib-
ited application of the Lacey Act on an extraterritorial basis.
Finally, expansion of the Lacey Act's jurisdiction to include extra-
territorial conduct deters the taking of wildlife which is prohibited
under United States law. Expansion of the Lacey Act's jurisdiction
supports the United States commitment to and policies of conserva-
tion of endangered and threatened wildlife. By restrictions on and
sanctioning United States citizens wherever they go regarding taking
wildlife, the United States is more effective in uniform enforcement
of wildlife laws.
JULIA C. SHEPARD
143. A plurality of the United States Supreme Court reviewed standing as it ap-
plied to environmental groups in Lujan. The Court stated:
[Tlhe irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three elements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact" - an invasion of a
legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) "ac-
tual or imminent, not 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" Second, there must be a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of - the
injury has to be "fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defend-
ant and not ... thle] result [of] the independent action of some third party not
before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as opposed to merely "specula-
tive," that the injury will be "redressed by a favorable decision."
112 S. Ct. at 2136 (citations omitted).
